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Twilight of Neoliberalism 
LAURENCE COX
DYLAN TAYLOR – A recurrent theme in your writing 
concerns the often fraught relationship of the academy to 
activism. In a paper co-authored with Colin Barker, you go 
so far as to say ‘academic work is in a sense parasitic on facts 
mostly produced by movements’.1 Elsewhere you have argued 
that ‘much of the knowledge now treated as unproblematically 
academic, including some of its highest-status products, 
has roots in the efforts of popular movements to contest the 
status quo’.2 Could you speak on this theme of movements 
as knowledge producers, and of the problematic position of 
the academy in regards to activism? How have you reconciled 
your own position as a scholar pursuing an academic career 
with your commitment to activism?
LAURENCE COX – That paper came out of a long dialogue 
with Colin, where we both recognised that, as activists, 
we had learned a huge amount from other people in our 
movements—through internal debate and in pamphlets, 
magazines, and books. Colin had been an active Marxist for 
1 Colin Barker and Laurence Cox, ‘What Have the Romans 
Ever Done for Us?’ Paper presented at the 8th Alternative Futures 
and Popular Protest Conference, Manchester, 2002, http://eprints.
maynoothuniversity.ie/428/.
2 Laurence Cox, ‘Movements Making Knowledge,’ Sociology 48, no. 
5 (2014): 954–971.
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decades, so that was one point of reference as a movement-based tradition 
of political thought. And I knew this partly from the German Left, but also 
from the radical environmental movement, from being around anarchists, 
and through feminism. I was struggling to identify a place in the academy 
where I could usefully work, recognising how much of the radical thought 
of the 1960s and 1970s had moved into different academic niches (cultural 
studies, women’s studies, environmental studies, development studies, 
postcolonial studies, and so on), and also seeing the ways in which it had 
been deformed there, particularly in terms of losing the ability to think 
systematically about how we organise and what works best, which is 
fundamental if we want to go beyond simple outrage to actually changing 
things. I was very interested in the history, documented by both Raymond 
Williams and Edward Thompson, of the contentious relations between 
radical, movement-, or community-based thought and ‘polite’ thought. Of 
course, these Marxists had partly realised this through their experiences 
working with ‘non-traditional’ students, which was also what was shaping 
me most in the academic workplace, then and later.
The way Colin discussed the difference between activist and academic 
thought was to say that when Lukács (in his example) analysed a situation 
it was in order to say to his comrades ‘we blew it!’ And the ensuing question 
‘what is to be done?’ is also fundamental to any real activist thought. In 
contrast, academic social movement studies contented itself with an 
apparently neutral argument that showed how a particular set of events 
justified its author’s theoretical framework. I found, and still find, that 
at some level outrageous. It is one thing to mock each other when you 
have both been there, or between comrades, but to stand on the debris of 
people’s lives—which is often what is involved in successful movements—
and use it as a way to show how clever you are and how well you can make 
the sort of noises required by a particular academic in-group—that is pretty 
repugnant really.
The responses to that paper were very interesting. A lot of people 
clearly felt personally attacked, as they identified strongly and positively 
with being an academic in a very unreflective way. But what we actually 
argued is that all knowledge production takes place within given social 
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relationships.3 This understanding is inherent in any form of methodology 
and (if you like it) in the word ‘science’. It involves not just acknowledging 
this reality, but also reflecting on how to shape social relationships so as 
to produce particular kinds of knowledge. This is precisely what we were 
talking about: if you reflect on movements in one way, within one kind of 
social relationship, for one set of social purposes, then this will shape what 
you do; do things differently and the results will be different. It’s really very 
basic sociology of knowledge or history of ideas.
The other thing that I think was widely missed was an activist sense 
that we can and should shape the means of intellectual production in 
line with our purposes. Of course, at any given time there are different 
sorts of constraints, but these have to be thought about politically. That 
assessment—‘what kind of social structure am I entering into, and what 
can I realistically hope to do or change in that context?’—is really basic 
politics. But simply identifying with whatever structures we happen to find 
ourselves within and then treating them as an expression of our political 
self is a very damaging form of alienation. In the academic-activist context, 
it is far more honest to say, as a number of good activists have said to me, 
‘I’m really sorry, but now I have to get a permanent job out of this research, 
and to do that I simply have to publish a certain kind of thing in certain 
journals and get certain awards, and that determines everything else I do’. 
For me, that paper came out of, and responded to, all the non-academic 
movement intellectuals that I had worked with and drew on, as an honest 
recognition of their work and against the belief that the only good thinking 
about movements happens within academia. For at least a decade it was my 
most widely read and commented on piece, usually by people from activist 
backgrounds trying to make sense of what was often an intellectual desert 
in social movement studies. As Thompson puts it, the important thing is 
to acknowledge that there are vibrant intellectual traditions outside the 
‘polite’ world of the academy. In some ways, it is outrageous that the US 
scholars who constructed ‘social movement studies’ as an academic subfield 
in the 1960s and 1970s could declare terra nullius, that nobody worth 
3 See also Laurence Cox, ‘Scholarship and Activism,’ Studies in Social Justice 9, no. 1 
(2015): 34–53.
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mentioning had ever thought about movements systematically or was 
doing so anywhere else (think of Marxist history, feminism, black studies, 
postcolonial studies, or cultural studies, for example), and that ‘real science’ 
meant referring to them and their work. It is a matter of intellectual self-
respect not to accept that kind of colonial attitude.
It was also part of starting to work with a number of long-time activists, 
mature students who wanted to research their own movements’ practices. 
That stayed with me and is still, as a dialogue, one of the most important 
things I do. If we don’t start with some clarity and honesty in that dialogue 
about the differences between knowledge production within movements 
and the knowledge production in academia, the outcome will not be great. 
Beyond that, I then took on the question of seeing how we could open 
up the space of research on social movements, which in some ways has been 
the central theme of my work in that area. So both Interface and the MA 
in activism did that in different ways and on different scales. Intellectually 
this is also part of the point of working on Marxism and social movements, 
and of articulating the various different activist and academic traditions of 
researching movements that the canonised ‘social movement studies’ tried 
to dismiss.
Creating the space for activist research, participatory research, or 
research outside the narrow bounds of canonical ‘social movement studies’, 
has been an ongoing struggle in different ways and at different levels. My 
sense is that, in some contexts at least, things are now a lot more open and 
dialogical between activism and academia. 
You played a founding role in Interface, a journal that explicitly addresses 
the relationship between activism and the academy.4 Could you talk a little 
about the process of setting this publication up, and its aim? What are the 
biggest challenges the journal has faced in bringing together academic and 
activist perspectives and practices?
Interface was a product of a new generation of activists coming out of the 
anti-capitalist movement at the turn of the millennium—getting involved 
4 http://interfacejournal.net.
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with academic research, and reacting strongly both to how the dominant 
form of social movement studies excluded their own movements’ forms of 
theorising and how it insisted that its questions were the only legitimate ones. 
It is also no coincidence that this happened in a less rarefied atmosphere, 
both in the sense of the relative democratisation of higher education after 
the 1960s and in the context of the precarisation of researchers from the 
mid-2000s.
We drew on two basic models. One was our own practices in the 
alterglobalist/anti-capitalist ‘movement of movements’ of the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, where we discovered how to work together with people 
across real distances—not just physical and cultural, but also political and 
tactical—bringing together different movements around a shared opposition 
to neoliberalism. We understood how to create a substantial space for 
internal diversity while still holding a clear common line that defined what 
we weren’t—‘one no, many yeses’ so to speak. I was particularly proud that 
we could and can do that: we have eco-feminists and Trotskyists, liberals 
and autonomists, alternative types and people from the labour movement 
able to work together; that is quite an achievement. 
The other was the model provided by Colin Barker and Mike 
Tyldesley’s Alternative Futures and Popular Protest conference, where the 
idea for Interface was hatched. Colin and Mike held a very open space, 
in which a high proportion of participants were also activists, but from 
very different spaces—old socialists, younger, direct-action eco-anarchist 
types, feminists, counter-cultural people, and so on. Because there was no 
status involved, no instrumental reason to be there, people had very real 
conversations and it was a hugely collegial space. So we tried to capture 
some of that in Interface.
What we were interested in was substantive knowledge about 
movements, rather than the particular questions that were allowable or 
valued within a given discipline. But that issue also applies very much today 
to radical political traditions, which have often become neoliberalised, 
turned into niche markets where people tell one another a very particular 
story about the rest of the world and the chance of learning from other 
movements is lost. So the phrase ‘learning from each other’s struggles’ is 
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a useful one in that context—taking knowledge seriously. And then, of 
course, Interface had to be genuinely international, with people involved 
in or studying movements in a given region doing the editing, rather than 
a metropolitan central committee selecting what it wanted to hear, and to 
include both the academic and activist worlds. 
That last aim was the biggest challenge, given that, if not tied to a 
particular movement, the natural centre of gravity of such things is likely 
to be both academic and tied to the founding generation. So we made it 
a practitioner journal, with one activist and one academic reviewer, and 
we test our issue themes against this double question: is this useful for 
movements, and is it intellectually solid? One thing that is particularly 
good to see is that it hasn’t become a generational vehicle—very few of the 
current editors were there at the start, which is how it should be.
The net effect is that we manage to at least gesture towards this idea 
of knowledge from and for movements, in the sense that each issue is 
genuinely diverse in terms of geographical and movement focus, academic 
and activist emphases, and different political and disciplinary traditions. 
It is a long way off being perfect, but the hope is that someone can pick it 
up and at least eavesdrop on conversations about organising that are not 
normally going on in their own space.
As mentioned earlier, you were involved in the establishment of a Masters 
programme in community education, equality, and social activism at the 
National University of Ireland, Maynooth. What led to the foundation of 
this programme? What kind of programme was it? 
This programme came out of the movement of movements, the experience 
that it was becoming possible again for people in different social movements 
to work together, and the development of a language and set of practices 
that made it workable. It also came at a moment when ‘social partnership’ 
with the state, which had co-opted every movement in the country except 
for the peace movement and republicanism, was starting to break down.
So we thought it was the right time to set up a programme for activists, 
as a practitioner MA geared primarily towards people who were already 
157
competent activists, but needed time out from day-to-day firefighting to 
reflect on what they were doing and if it was actually working. We used 
the strapline ‘learning from each other’s struggles’, because one of the 
effects not just of partnership with the state, but also of how neoliberalism 
fragments us into different niche markets, is that we lose the sense of how 
other movements respond to challenges which are often not very different 
to ours; we cut ourselves off from a vast amount of learning simply by 
saying that all we are interested in is this one movement’s experience. 
There is also the question of how to make real alliances. At a weekend 
gathering you might not spend much time with people who aren’t easy to 
get on with—but of course those are the alliances you really need, because 
you don’t already have them. If you spend a year in a small group setting 
with those same people, however, you will get a much better sense of the 
social realities they are speaking from, what they mean when they say this 
or that, and how they do things—which are often very different for (say) 
working class community activists, ecological direct action activists, labour 
organisers, feminists, trans people, or migrant activists.
Concretely, we offered people a course which focussed not on ‘the 
issues’ as many advocacy courses do, but on the practice of organising—
for example, the history of struggles for equality and the unintended 
consequences of particular gains (democracy, nation-states, welfare states, 
cultural liberation); radical popular education as a theory and practice of 
organising; feminist theory and practice, which was transformative for 
many activists; and so on—wrapping it all up with a dissertation geared 
toward improving the practice of students’ own movements in a given area.
The course is currently on ice, because with the axing of postgraduate 
grants there just aren’t enough people who can afford to do it. But we did 
have five years of bringing together some of the best activists in the country 
across different movements.
In collaboration with Colin Barker, Alf Gunvald Nilsen, and John Krinsky, 
among others, you have put a great deal of energy into developing a ‘Marxist 
theory of social movements’. What does Marxism have to offer those studying 
or participating in social movements today? 
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My starting point is Thompson’s observation that the question is not whether 
we are on Marx’s side, it is if Marx is on our side—meaning on the side of 
radical activists, the wider world of social movements and communities in 
struggle, and people who are struggling to survive and resist exploitation, 
oppression, and cultural stigmatisation.5 I’ve found that a very helpful 
touchstone. It means leaning away from the false security offered by a 
particular reading of books or a particular consensus within an organisation 
and instead asking: ‘what can I usefully say to other activists?’ And often the 
answer to that does come out of Marxism. But it’s not because it’s Marxist 
that people who are engaged in struggle find it helpful or convincing. As 
Colin has said, for the first time in many decades Marxism is not widely 
available to people in movements, and it has to convince them on its own 
merits rather than through deference to authority. This is actually a far 
better filter for Marxism than those which operate either in academia or in 
the sectarian world.
In We Make Our Own History, Alf and I argue that the great strength 
of Marxism for movements is precisely that it is, in its origins and much 
of its development, a theory ‘from and for movements’.6 In other words, 
it comes from people who were involved in, working with, and thinking 
about a huge variety of revolutions and popular struggles; in some ways 
it articulates and systematises those very complex and contested processes 
of movement learning. We don’t think Marxism was unique in this, and 
we invite others to consider how this could be done in relation to other 
forms of ‘frozen movement knowledge’ elsewhere in academic theory. I 
collaborated on a special issue of Interface that tried to draw this out in 
relation to feminism (and of course, each issue is trying to do that in one 
way or another). 
I do think that Marxism has particular strengths here, not least in the 
length of experience and the many different debates within it over the 
years. If you really ground yourself in what Marxists have argued about 
within movements and parties, you have a solid starting-point for thinking 
about the struggles of the present. My impression is that Marxists find 
5 Edward Thompson, Poverty of Theory (London: Merlin, 1978), 384.
6 Laurence Cox and Alf Nilsen, We Make Our Own History (London: Pluto, 2014).
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it easier to think about popular agency and its complexities than other 
traditions where the dominant rhetoric is that simply being oppressed/
exploited/culturally stigmatised is the important thing, and it is almost 
disloyal to ask about the different things people do about it. The Marxist 
tradition has spent a very long time thinking about the problem that, 
despite being exploited, workers do not automatically behave radically or 
even decently—one basic challenge to overcome has usually been forms 
of particularism which manifest as racism, imperialism, an ‘aristocracy of 
labour’, a patriarchal view of things, and so on. The important questions, 
then, are why that is and how to overcome it. 
This is very different from the feeling that if, for example, you 
acknowledge that very large numbers of women put a lot of effort into 
maintaining Catholicism in Ireland, you are somehow letting the side down. 
Of course it was those churchgoers, nuns, housewives, moral entrepreneurs, 
and vicious defenders of ‘respectability’ who really let the side down, often 
at their own daughters’ expense—and the real political question is how 
to overcome this sort of relationship. Similarly, there is nothing ‘Marxist’ 
about an identity politics which valorises being ‘working class’ in a way 
which is aimed against ethnic minorities, women’s, or LGBTQI+ struggles 
etc. This is really basic to thinking about movements: you can either try to 
find a side to celebrate and a side to condemn as if it was a gameshow, or 
you can try to overcome those particularisms and build serious alliances 
by defeating conservatives in our own movements and making broader 
alliances. That challenge exists within every movement.
So Marxism has a capacity to think seriously about organised agency 
and has a long history of different approaches, which is useful for thinking 
through present-day challenges. One other thing that I think most people 
working on Marxism and movements are trying to bring out is a serious 
understanding of the developmental nature of struggle. Struggle is not just 
something that happens at one level (which is the problem with fetishising 
any one type of action, be it occupations or political parties, cultural 
struggle or non-violent resistance); it always has a potential, sometimes 
considerable, sometimes small, to go further and move beyond the 
boundaries of its existing social context. But it is important not to see this 
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in some idealist way, but rather as arising directly out of material conditions 
and how people engage with them, and as structured by the process of 
constructing a movement on more and more powerful scales.
So in the terms Alf and I use, people in given social situations have to 
develop their own local rationalities for coping, defending what they have, 
and attempting to change things on a small scale. When there is a major 
conflict, it is these pre-existing ways of doing things that form the basis 
for militant particularisms—a particular classed, or gendered, or ethnic, 
or more commonly all three, way of doing things which erupts as the 
basis for resistance. To become what we call a campaign, struggles in one 
place need to find a resonance with struggles elsewhere, or (as sometimes 
happens) spark them off. A conflict over a single issue in a single place 
becomes something very different when people start to work on a wider 
scale of struggle. This involves all sorts of organisational and educational 
aspects, as well as making allies, so it almost always means remaking the 
movement. Beyond that, different campaigns are sometimes able to come 
together around a movement project, a sense of being part of a common 
struggle against a particular social order or for a certain vision of the world. 
Obviously, that means something more than a small group in a room—if 
it isn’t felt very widely and deeply, it doesn’t have much social purchase. It 
is these projects that are capable of provoking systemic crises, or even being 
the basis for a new world. 
This underpins what we call the ‘ABC of activism’: what an experienced 
or well-read activist knows about what they can do beyond what is 
immediately obvious, how to avoid reinventing the wheel (which is very 
costly for movements), and how to take things further, make allies, radicalise 
the issues, and so on. Very often, if you look into successful movements, 
you will find people doing this kind of thing. Right now, if we want to 
convert social majorities into a different kind of society, that perspective is 
very badly needed.
There is also a wider project of recovering Marxism for movements, 
beyond the stylised forms it has come to survive in. In that sense, the 
project is to assert Marxism against Marxisms—to keep asking ‘how does 
this way of organising, this kind of question, this sort of rhetoric actually 
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help popular struggles?’ Of course, sometimes the answer is not only that 
it doesn’t, but that (in its academic forms) it has no particular intention of 
doing so. 
How does your approach to Marxism and social movements tie into con-
siderations of the role that political parties play (or could play), and, by 
extension, of the state?
In We Make Our Own History, we give a quick run-through of all the 
different things ‘party’ has meant since the moment where Marx and 
Engels denied that communists formed a separate party opposed to other 
working class parties (in a book with the word Partei in its title). ‘Party’ is 
not a single thing; it is a question, one for which there aren’t many very 
convincing answers right now. A Marxism that ignores this history, and 
has not seriously thought about what self-declared Marxist parties did 
to working class struggle in Spain, in Eastern Europe, or in Beijing, for 
example, does not deserve the name.
The serious question is something like: ‘how best can radicals involved 
in social movements work together for a change greater than would be 
possible if movements remain fragmented and focussed on local gains 
alone?’ At the moment, if we look at Syriza or Podemos in Western Europe, 
we are in a period where the previous history of Left experiments with the 
party has reached some kind of end-point and there is no longer much 
serious learning from the past. Syriza-as-was stands in a longer tradition 
of New Left party development and learning. By contrast, Podemos is the 
initiative of a small (largely academic) group who piggybacked on the much 
wider indignad@s movement in Spain. After the failure of both approaches, 
the questions need to be asked again.
What is not helpful here is the sort of school-debate model in which 
everyone has to have a commitment in principle for or against parties as 
such. Often, for example, in commentaries on the indignad@s or whatever, 
we are told in detail what a failure this or that initiative is; but then we 
are asked to put our faith in parties with absolutely no examination of the 
actual failure of Left parties in the present. So we compare the difficult 
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reality of a massive movement with somebody’s imagined Platonic ideal of 
the Party. This is not comradely debate or even adult thinking.
Clearly we need to find ways of working together. One important thing 
that should have been learned from the last 150 years of attempts to do so 
is the importance of honest debate, learning from the past, and creating 
space for dissent. That would involve taking a good look at the ways in 
which radical activists already interact, because in this sense ‘party-ness’, the 
attempt to identify a way of working together, is a constant feature of popular 
struggles, and the real question is whether we are doing it well or badly. 
If an organisation calls itself a party (or even a movement), but other 
activists experience it as instrumentalising movement development rather 
than supporting it, it is not helping popular agency. Similarly, if rather 
than seriously attempting to develop counter-hegemony (and so putting 
some of its own corporate interests to one side) it is attempting only to 
impose its own agenda and stack committees, it is not helping to develop 
popular agency. The Anglophone opposition between ‘movement’ and 
‘party’ expresses a massive failure on the part of Left parties in this respect: 
criticising movements for not seeing how good a bigger party would be is 
no solution to their own historic failure to convince movement activists 
that their own party is an effective contribution.
I don’t agree that we can usefully talk about parties ‘and, by extension, 
the state’. I would say that this is part of the problem in terms of not 
thinking more historically about the issue. By historically I mean both a 
non-caricatured sense of the history of Left parties over the past 150 years 
in different countries, but also a non-caricatured sense of the changing 
nature of the state in that period. Again, the challenge is not to assume that 
there is some non-dialectic ‘essence-of-state’ to which an ‘essence-of-party’ 
is always and everywhere the right answer, without needing to think hard 
about what these things mean in different times and places.
There are multiple contradictions here. In Western Europe we have just 
come through a period in which, much as in the mid-19th century, radical 
movements were really unable to have a significant and sustained presence 
in parliaments, the mainstream media, and so on. We are now seeing a 
situation in which actual Left majorities in parliament are still almost 
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impossible in most cases, but where across the European periphery (Greece, 
Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Iceland) there is no social majority for austerity. 
Yet despite this, and the legitimacy problems it causes for neoliberalism 
(broken mandates, technocratic governments, referenda rerun, the 2015 
Greek crisis, and so on), the European Union’s austerity politics rolls on. 
In this situation, the eggs-in-one-basket logic of ‘one last push and we 
can outdo Syriza’ is about as helpful as the ‘one last push’ of the Communist 
Party of Germany (KPD) in the early 1920s. Insofar as there is a choice to 
be made in Western Europe, our energies should surely go primarily into 
building up our strength where we have it—those social majorities and 
radical movements. I don’t mean avoiding parliamentary politics where it is 
useful or necessary, but rejecting the belief that a terrain which we do not 
control and where our track record has been consistently poor over many 
decades is, by definition, the best use of everyone’s time and energy. 
One key aspect here is internationalism. In practice, the nostalgic 
Left has become deeply national in its political focus, so that the interest 
is consistently in single-state experiences like Greece. But even if Syriza 
had been more determined or circumstances had been better it would 
have been a very uneven battle. This is what the anti-capitalist movement 
was pointing towards with its summit protests 15 years ago, and it is no 
less true today. Our resistance has to be genuinely international, and that 
immediately runs up against the fact that none of the niche ‘internationals’, 
whichever flavour of the Left they represent, are remotely strong enough to 
mount a successful challenge across many different countries, nor are likely to 
become so. So an international resistance that is serious about winning has to 
be much more oriented to difference and alliances for entirely realist reasons.
Where we can learn something very useful about the nature of the 
state, and our possible relationship to it, is from Latin America and the 
different relationships between movements and more or less Left-inflected 
governments over the past 15 years: the experience of the Brazilian Worker’s 
Party (PT) in relation to, for example, the Landless Worker’s Movement 
(MST), and, as we have seen, its inability to turn formal power into 
real power; the much more radical but very contradictory experiences of 
Ecuador and Bolivia, where real attempts at reshaping the state to reflect 
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the struggles of poor communities and Indigenous populations have been 
hollowed out by neo-extractivism; the authoritarian turn in Venezuela (no 
surprise to anyone familiar with the history of the cult of leadership); or the 
failure that is Left Peronism in Argentina. There is also the question of what 
international solidarity has looked like in those contexts.
If we turn these party-fetishising clichés on their heads, we need to 
talk seriously about the Zapatista experience of sustaining a revolution 
and a very effective dual-power situation over 24 years among some of 
the poorest and most disadvantaged people on the planet. We also need to 
pay a lot more attention to the revolution in Rojava, which is absolutely 
extraordinary under the circumstances. This should not be to repeat the 
essentialism of presenting these as models that everyone else should follow 
slavishly, but seriously thinking about what revolution might mean in our 
own circumstances. That might sound like a refusal to analyse, but one of 
the obvious things about the actual history of revolutions is how rarely they 
have been the product of ideologically-directed political parties. Far more 
commonly they arrive unexpectedly from below and shake up movements and 
organisations like a house of cards. 
It is common for people studying social movements to focus on ‘movements 
from below’—the struggles of those who lack economic decision-making 
power, privileged access to the state, or cultural privilege—but you, along with 
Nilsen, also speak of ‘movements from above’. What types of movements are 
these? How would the rise of the alt-Right be characterised here?
The important thing is to see the social world as humanly constructed—
not just as an intellectual starting-point, but also because it makes it 
changeable politically. So we have to think about the different forms of 
collective agency, how human beings coordinate their action to keep the 
world the way they want it or change it in another direction. Often in the 
social sciences and Left analysis, we think of ‘their’ world, the world as it 
has been created by the agency of the powerful, as the given structure and 
therefore inaccessible to most human action; relatedly, the tendency is to 
see movements from below as some kind of occasional blip on that surface. 
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This wildly underestimates the scale of popular agency, even though most 
of that is structured in terms of local rationalities (everyday coping and 
culture) or militant particularisms (moments of local resistance). 
It is also a very first-world way of thinking. When you look at the 
majority of the world you see that most states were founded through 
successful resistance to empire. On another level this is the history of the 
formation of parliamentary nation-states in Europe too. In Ireland, as in 
much of the world, this process took place within living memory. So we 
need some term to think about ‘movements-become-states’. This is very 
different to the conservative US model of movements which basically 
assumes that the polity is fixed and separated off into different fixed ‘levels’, 
so that movements appear as some sort of semi-structured level between 
voter preferences and political parties or interest groups. (It is telling 
that this approach positions, for example, trade unions or churches as by 
definition different from movements.)
We need to step back from bourgeois science in a pejorative sense—as 
a science that eternalises the status quo as ontological categories—and ask: 
how do human beings organise their agency collectively? Movements from 
below are those which, lacking wealth, power, or cultural privilege, have to 
rely on numbers, disruption, cultural creativity, and so on in order to win. 
That does not in itself make them progressive, although there is a general 
tendency towards that direction.
Conversely, movements from above are not automatically ‘bad 
movements’ (though again there are strong tendencies!); rather, they are 
movements that have privileged access to the mechanisms of state power, 
to economic decision-making, and to cultural authority and privilege. For 
example, fascist violence depends, almost by definition, on tolerance from 
the state. Fascism invokes both racial/ethnic and gender hierarchies; and 
when it has come to power it has usually been as the result of an alliance 
with established right-wing parties (and on occasion foreign states). Finally, 
in its origins in countries such as Italy, fascists were the paid gunmen 
defending landowners against peasant occupations, or attacking powerful 
labour movements on behalf of employers. So that gives a particularly 
obvious sense of what makes it different in its modes of operation from a 
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movement that does not have these kinds of mechanisms to work with 
and therefore structures itself differently. This, incidentally, is a strength 
of thinking about agency instead of simply looking at people’s structural 
position: you can start not only to understand (for example) conservative 
religious women, working class racists, and so on, but also to see how to 
defeat those movements.
However, there are many different ways in which movements from 
above can work. Neoliberalism, for instance, basically conquered the 
institutions from within—the international financial institutions; the 
boardrooms of multinational corporations; right-wing and then centre-left 
political parties; and academia and journalism. 
A successful movement from above has a lot of work to do, and this 
is important if we are thinking how to defeat the new authoritarianisms 
across the world. It has to impose itself both against previously 
dominant accumulation strategies (Fordism, state socialism, national-
developmentalism), but also against alternative futures from above and 
below in the kind of crisis involved in its own rise; it has to deal with 
resistance from below, either offensively or defensively; it has to develop 
an effective hegemonic strategy that goes beyond coercion and brings a 
wide range of other social groups on board; and it has to keep the show 
on the road. So it is no particular surprise when (as we have seen in the 
EU in particular) fewer and fewer of those running the ship can really be 
called statesmen or stateswomen, people who understand that the whole 
arrangement has been constructed and needs to be maintained by work 
outside and beyond its routines. Rather, more and more of them have 
mastered the skills of getting on within the apparatus, but are lost when it 
comes to dealing with things beyond that. The UK Blairites’ inability to deal 
with Corbyn and Momentum, for example, illustrated this wonderfully.
The alt-Right is largely a cultural phenomenon. As we have seen with 
elements of the Trump team, even when it nominally comes close to power 
it isn’t particularly good at keeping or using it. In a sense it is the Internet 
version of fascist street thugs: it does useful dirty work for more powerful 
opponents. As with street fascism, it needs to be countered on that terrain, 
but we have to keep an eye on the bigger picture and not think that if we 
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win an online argument we have really solved things—there will always be 
useful idiots of this kind. 
At present, we are seeing a lot of it in the media and to some extent in 
academia. As with the much more serious actions of Modi, Sisi, Erdoğan, 
Putin, Salvini, Órban, and so on, it is important to recognise that there is an 
experimental aspect to this. If they are successful there will be carpetbaggers 
who follow them, and academics or journalists who follow the new star; 
while if we are capable of seeing these authoritarian figures off the same 
people will loudly proclaim their distance.
More broadly of course, as around Brexit, the alt-Right is a 
manifestation of the crisis of neoliberalism. The older establishment doesn’t 
really know what to do or how to keep the show on the road, and lacks 
the capacity to do more than keep doing what it’s always done and hope 
it will be enough. So you get expendable buffoons like Boris Johnson or 
Nigel Farage in the UK—if they are successful politically, others will row 
in behind them, but it is no great loss to the powers that be if they are 
laughed out of existence. It is similar with the alt-Right. If they can ‘change 
the conversation’ and invoke the sort of combination of racism, militarism, 
misogyny, authoritarianism, religious conservatism, anti-communism, and 
so on that buttressed the Thatcher and Reagan coalitions (for different 
ends) they will be suitably boosted and rewarded. If not, or if they manage 
to turn off more people than they convince, the taps supporting them will 
be closed. So a ‘movements from above’ analysis is helpful in asking what 
actual strength these groups have beyond the support of right-wing media, 
for example. In most places they have little organising capacity on the 
ground by comparison with more conventional far-Right groups. 
You just mentioned that there is a crisis of neoliberalism, and the subtitle of 
the book you co-authored with Nilsen is Marxism and Social Movements in the 
Twilight of Neoliberalism. As neo-liberalism can be a slippery term, I wondered 
if you might briefly define what you mean when deploying this term. Second, 
what leads you to argue it is in its twilight? 
Let’s start by talking about ‘neoliberalism’ linguistically, in terms of actual 
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usage, because too often we find a very naïve definitional approach to the 
term. Around the turn of the century, when the phrase started to be used in 
our movements, I remember thinking that it wouldn’t catch on against the 
existing vocabulary of cuts and privatisation. What made it catch on was 
its practical use in the processes of forming the anti-capitalist ‘movement of 
movements’, ultimately going back to the Zapatistas, but then also worked 
out at summit protests, through Parliamentarians for Global Action, social 
forums, Indymedia, and so on. In this context, its function was to enable 
alliances by identifying the bigger evil these different movements were 
fighting against, whether they were organised around labour or ecological 
issues, Indigenous or peasant struggles, feminism or anti-war activism, and 
so on. It marked an end to the period where if you personally organised 
around one issue or dimension of inequality you were constantly told that 
your main enemy was people who were organising around something else. 
So in terms of actual usage, its main meaning was ‘capitalism as we 
know it’. There were two other dimensions to this. One was an awareness 
that contemporary capitalism had changed massively, as against national-
developmentalism in the majority world or Fordism in the West. The other 
was understanding that this change hadn’t just ‘happened’. Rather, there 
had been a very substantial defeat of the Left, as well as an earlier process 
of revolt against Fordism culminating in the ‘long 1968’. So part of what 
our book does is to account for this kind of experience—neoliberalism as 
a movement from above. Our approach to neoliberalism is that it is a form 
of capitalism systematically imposed, unevenly and on different timescales, 
after the political and economic crisis of the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
The question then becomes understanding not what its theologians say, 
but what the social bases for its success were—in other words, how this 
new accumulation strategy could become so hegemonic. Because if we 
understand that, we have a much better idea of what kind of struggle is 
needed to defeat it.
When we brought the book out, the idea that neoliberalism was in 
its twilight years provoked much raising of eyebrows by people who had 
spent their academic lives explaining just how deep-seated neoliberalism 
is. This is part of the academisation of movement thinking: it rewards 
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‘contemplative’ accounts which present things as uniquely bad, theoretically 
profound, and almost inaccessible to human agency. But just four years on 
and the dogs in the street are saying neoliberalism is in crisis. The Trump 
election and the British referendum to leave the EU have shown that there 
is no longer a broad consensus for ‘business as usual’ neoliberalism, and 
that groups who previously benefitted from neoliberalism now experience 
themselves as losers. At the same time, the (British) Labour Party and the 
(US) Democrats, previously safely captured for neoliberalism and the New 
World Order, have become remarkably restive. France, too, has strayed 
from course, caught between Nuit Debout and Macron. On the European 
periphery, neoliberalism has very definitely ceased to be hegemonic; we 
have there a kind of zombie neoliberalism, while popular struggles have 
shifted well to the Left. In Germany and other core countries, organised 
voices that at least claim to be opposed to neoliberalism are more articulated 
on the far-Right. Meanwhile, the combination of formal democratisation 
and neoliberal rollout that seemed unstoppable around the world has hit 
some severe speedbumps and we are seeing new kinds of authoritarianism 
precisely because countries like Brazil, South Africa, India, Egypt, or Turkey 
are so politically contested. In other words, there is a crisis of neoliberal 
hegemony, a crisis of popular consent.
As previously, where ‘1968’ hollowed out popular support for Fordism, 
state socialism, and national-developmentalism, much of that critical 
work has been done in the anti-capitalist movement, particularly in Latin 
America; in global resistance to the ‘war on terror’; in all sorts of climate 
struggles; in Indigenous resistance; and in anti-austerity struggles. So the 
gradual coming-together of struggles against neoliberalism has been really 
important, in all sorts of ways. 
We are also seeing the long-term failure of the ‘war on terror’ to cement 
popular loyalty. And resistance to the war has ultimately been pretty 
effective: the West has largely had to retreat from land-based warfare (and 
scratch the plans for conquering one ‘rogue state’ after another). While that 
doesn’t prevent hugely destructive wars in Yemen, Syria, Libya, and so on, 
it does means that the US-led Empire is now largely reduced to burning 
frontier villages rather than extending its territory. Longer-term, of course, 
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we are seeing a very quick decline of the New World Order in which the US 
was supposed to be the world’s policeman, the enforcer of neoliberal power.
More widely, predicting the twilight of neoliberalism was actually a 
fairly easy bet. No form of capitalist accumulation has ever survived all 
that long. All else being equal, if profit rates boom at the start of a new 
accumulation strategy given the conditions of the time, the chances are that 
those conditions will gradually fade. Spoils are only available for a while. 
Eventually, there is no longer a growing cake to divide up, and flexibility 
declines massively, because many groups reach the point where the costs 
of exit no longer outweigh the possible gains from trying something new, 
or the cost of continuing as normal. Current EU politics illustrates this 
inability to move. Brexit is a godsend for them because it enables unity 
without decisions that risk an even more major crisis. This is also why 
it took neoliberals so long to agree even on a token response to climate 
change; and what we do have in the form of the Paris Agreement lacks any 
regulatory bite. But a lot of capital is now threatened by climate change, not 
least those parts of it associated with fixed investments in low-lying areas 
(like most cities). So the leadership that Gramsci thought a hegemonic 
group had to provide to stabilise and reproduce capitalism in a given period 
is increasingly absent. 
I think the most important thing we said was: ‘whether neoliberalism 
is ending is perhaps not the main question we should be asking. Such 
hegemonic projects have relatively short shelf-lives, induced by their 
declining ability to meet the interests of the key members of the alliances 
which underpin them. The real question is one of how much damage 
neoliberalism will do in its prolonged death agonies; and, even more 
importantly, what (or more sociologically, who) will replace it and how’.7 
That problem is more rather than less urgent in 2018.
We seem, then, to be entering a particularly tumultuous period in the West. 
What comfort might we take from neoliberalism being in its twilight when 
there are so many causes for despair? What developments give you hope?
7 Cox and Nilsen, We Make Our Own History, xiii.
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In a good old-fashioned Marxist way, history gives me hope! At least in 
relation to the rise of the Right and how liberals prefer a Right that will 
continue the capitalist project over any kind of mass-based Left. We have 
been here before, harder and worse, and we won, though not without 
an incredible amount of suffering. The same is true in terms of mass 
displacement and foreign wars—nothing here is new, and our current 
international law on refugees is the product of earlier experiences that the 
Right are anxious to consign to the past.
Much of our despair comes from false expectations—from wanting 
people to learn from history because we value education, or even wanting 
history to have a sort of Whiggish trend upwards despite all the defeats, perhaps 
in terms of life getting better for ‘people like us’. So despair should be a prod to 
think harder about what we have been emotionally relying on and why. 
Climate change and species destruction do represent something 
qualitatively new, something which threatens the whole species on a much 
longer timescale, beyond neoliberalism, capitalism, or even class society. 
Again though, it is important to see where our own reactions come from, 
because we have to be able to act effectively in difficult circumstances. I 
am strongly shaped by growing up in the shadow of the second Cold War 
initiated by Reagan and Thatcher in the early 1980s, when there was a very 
real possibility that Europe would become the site of a nuclear war. As a 
teenager this situation was terrifying, not least because it provided an external 
hook for all sorts of psychological issues. But it is important to remember 
that we did, in fact, win. The peace movement helped push Reagan to the 
Reykjavik agreements and to step back from the brink fairly quickly. 
One thing I took from that experience was a determination to resist 
this psychological fixation on external horrors, and to encourage people 
into a much healthier emotional space, of seeing themselves as potentially 
effective agents in the world. In this respect, the sort of Left that invests 
mainly in terrifying people, or in dystopian analyses of neoliberalism and 
foreign policy, that places social change beyond the reach of popular agency 
is deeply, fundamentally irresponsible. It is often a mystified response to 
what is in itself a perfectly healthy alienation from one’s own culture of 
origin and the need to read and communicate with others to find some kind 
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of distance from that. The mystification comes when you say implicitly to 
one another: ‘we will validate our own suffering and alienation by adopting 
a position in which our own superior knowledge of “how bad things are” 
becomes comforting, because it sets us on a different plane to other people’. 
And you therefore step away from attempting any wider communication or 
organisation and from having any effect on the world.
When you look closely at the people who do they are often shilling 
for an NGO, some left subculture which revolves around consuming 
opinions, or a sect. They are inviting you not to think too hard about 
agency because then you might start asking questions about how paying 
your subscription, following them on Twitter, or being a member is going 
to translate into radical social change. So what is at stake is having a morally 
and intellectually serious relationship to our own agency. In this sense, it 
is about genuinely learning from history, the history of the Left, and not 
settling for the first or second thing that presents itself because it suits us 
emotionally. If we don’t think seriously about our own motivations, and 
those of the much larger number of other people for whom what we find 
psychologically obvious isn’t obvious and who therefore act differently, we 
become prisoners of them.
In terms of hope, talking to people involved in movements, or reading 
about them, brings up the huge amount of activism that is going on all the 
time, which, apart from its direct successes, also helps to stop things from 
getting worse or prevent certain things from being implemented. Of course, 
it is very easy, almost the default, to only hear about what the other side is 
doing, but that is desperately disempowering and historically quite naïve.
The world I grew up in was in large part a world of dictatorships. 
Quasi-fascist ones with death squads and torture chambers in much of Latin 
America, state socialism across another third of the world, apartheid in South 
Africa, Marcos in the Philippines, the list goes on. Virtually all of those 
regimes disappeared, washed away by popular power and, in many cases, 
revolutions, and I have to explain to students what the Iron Curtain was. 
So the list goes on: I live in a country where peasants got the land, where 
empire had to withdraw, and where nuclear power was defeated. Most of 
the states on my continent were formed in revolutions—democratic ones 
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against monarchies, nationalist ones, socialist ones, anti-fascist ones, and 
democratic ones again. Like Ken Macleod said, our children eat ice-cream 
and giggle in the palaces of dead rulers. What gives me hope in this sense 
is a consistent focus on struggles from below and what they have achieved, 
with all their ambiguities, contradictions, and limits. The real comparison 
is with how bad things could be—with the old monarchies, robber-baron 
capitalism, imperialism, or fascism. The difference there is one we have made. 
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